实时竞价中的佣金率问题研究

beoplay体育提现学报（社会科学版） ›› 2019, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 77-86.

实时竞价中的佣金率问题研究

江朝力,聂雅,索贵彬

河北地质大学,河北石家庄 050031

收稿日期:2019-08-12 出版日期:2019-09-25 发布日期:2019-09-25
作者简介:江朝力（1978-）,女,河北安国人,河北地质大学,讲师,研究方向：投资决策、产业经济|聂雅（1981-）,女,河北栾城人,河北地质大学,讲师,研究方向：系统优化、定量分析
基金资助:
河北省社会科学发展研究课题“京津冀协同发展背景下河北省战略性新兴产业发展路径及对策研究”(201602020210);国家社会科学基金项目“生态视角下京津冀地区污染密集产业再布局与规模问题研究”(17BJY076)

The study of commission rate problem in real-time bidding

JANG CHAOLI,NE YA,SUO GUIBIN

Hebei GEO University, Hebei Shijiazhuang 050031

Received:2019-08-12 Online:2019-09-25 Published:2019-09-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

论文基于广义一价拍卖机制下,对实时竞价中的佣金率展开探讨。通过最优化条件给出了在固定佣金率以及线性佣金率时需求方（DSP）的均衡报价策略,并且证明了在无保留价时,需求方的期望支出与任何形式的佣金率无关,佣金率只是改变了需求方的均衡报价策略。同时论文对既有保留价又有佣金率的情况进行阐述,指出在保留价存在时需求方的期望支出与佣金率相关,当佣金率增加时需求方的期望支出增加。即保留价存在时,需求方无法通过调整自己的均衡报价来对冲佣金率的提高对自己的期望损失。最后论文分别假定保留价和佣金率为外生给定,得出了最优佣金率和最优保留价满足的条件。

关键词: 决策分析, 实时竞价, 佣金率, 保留价, 广义一价拍卖

Abstract:

This paper studies the commission rate in real-time bidding based on the generalized first-price auction mechanism. Firstly, the equilibrium bidding strategies are provided when there are fixed commission rate and the linear commission rate, which proves that if the there is no reserve price, the expected payment of DSP is not related to the rate of commission. The commission rate affects the equilibrium bidding strategies only. Secondly, this paper shows that if there are the reserve price and the commission, the payment of DSP is increasing on the commission rate. That is, if there is reserve price, the DSP cannot control the increasing of the expected payment by adjusting the equilibrium bidding strategy, when the commission rate increases. Finally, provided that the reserve price and commission rate are exogenous respectively, this paper draws to the conclusion that the conditions of optimal commission rate and the optimal reserve price must be satisfied.

Key words: decision analysis, real-time bidding, commission rate, reserve price, the generalized first-price auction

中图分类号:

F713.359

江朝力,聂雅,索贵彬. 实时竞价中的佣金率问题研究[J]. beoplay体育提现学报（社会科学版）, 2019, 29(3): 77-86.

JANG CHAOLI,NE YA,SUO GUIBIN. The study of commission rate problem in real-time bidding[J]. Journal of Xidian University(Social Sciences Edition), 2019, 29(3): 77-86.

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