beoplay体育提现学报(社会科学版) ›› 2019, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 19-25.

• 管理学 • 上一篇    下一篇

“一带一路”背景下中医药产品国际化质量监管的多方博弈模型

赵可彤,孙秉珍   

  1. beoplay体育提现 经济与管理学院,陕西 西安 710071
  • 收稿日期:2018-11-03 出版日期:2019-03-25 发布日期:2019-06-19
  • 作者简介:赵可彤(1995-),女,陕西西安人,beoplay体育提现经济与管理学院管理科学与工程硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理与优化|孙秉珍(1979-),男,甘肃庆阳人,beoplay体育提现经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:不确定性群决策、供应链优化与决策以及应急决策。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(No.71571090);国家自然科学基金(No.71571090);国家自然科学基金(No.61772019);国家自然科学基金(No.61563029);中央高校基本科研业务费项目;beoplay体育提现人文与信息学科交叉项目(RW180167)

Multi-party game model for international quality supervision of traditional Chinese medicine products under the background of “the Belt and Road”

ZHAO KETONG,SUN BINGZHEN   

  1. Department of Social Science School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi’an,710071,China
  • Received:2018-11-03 Online:2019-03-25 Published:2019-06-19

摘要:

“一带一路”是新时期我国扩大和深化对外开放的战略性决策,这一宏伟计划进一步加强了中国和世界各国的互利合作。“一带一路”战略的深入实施,一方面为中医药这一中国特有的医疗技术走出国门,实现国际化提供了前所未有的发展机遇;另一方面,中医药在国际化过程中也面临着诸如文化背景差异、知识产权的流失、贸易壁垒以及产品质量安全等挑战。对“一带一路”的背景下的中医药国际化过程中的医药产品质量安全问题的研究,以现有运行良好的中医药国际化模式为研究基础,充分考虑参与产品质量监管的国内企业、国外合作机构和联合监管机构的产品质量监测行为,以各方利益最大化为目标,构建了三方静态博弈模型。通过研究监测成本等因素对于三方产品质量监测行为的影响可以发现监管的成本、监管的力度以及不监管可能带来的损失对于各方是否进行产品质量监测起决定性作用。

关键词: 一带一路, 中医药产品质量, 多方博弈, 不完信息

Abstract:

"The Belt and Road" is a strategic decision for China to expand and deepen its opening up in the new era. This grand plan further strengthens mutually beneficial cooperation between China and the rest of the world. The in-depth implementation of the "The Belt and Road" strategy provides an unprecedented opportunity for Chinese medicine to go abroad and achieve internationalization. On the other hand, Chinese medicine is also facing many challenges in the process of internationalization, such as background differences, loss of intellectual property rights, trade barriers, and product quality and safety. The research on the quality and safety of pharmaceutical products in the process of internationalization of traditional Chinese medicine in the context of the “Belt and Road” is based on the existing well-functioning internationalization model of Chinese medicine, and fully considers domestic enterprises and foreign countries involved in product quality supervision. The product quality monitoring behavior of the cooperative institutions and the joint regulatory agencies, with the goal of maximizing the interests of all parties, constructed a three-party static game model. By studying the impact of factors such as monitoring costs on the quality monitoring behavior of tripartite products, it can be found that the cost of supervision, the intensity of supervision, and the possible losses caused by non-regulation play a decisive role in whether or not the parties conduct product quality monitoring.

Key words: the Belt and Road, Chinese medicine product quality, multi-party game, endless information

中图分类号: 

  • R28